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s a Commissioner on the federal Commission on Wartime 
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan established by Congress in 
2008,1 I have been immersed in the issue of how to control the abuses 
and injuries of private security contractors.  The key incident 
 
∗ Commissioner, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan; 
Professor, University of Baltimore Law School; J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard Law 
School, 1977; B.A., summa cum laude, Columbia College, 1974. 
1 Further information on the Commission may be found on its website, 
http://www.wartimecontracting.gov.  The Commission has held a number of televised 
hearings and issued several reports.  This Article represents the views of its author alone 
and not those of the Commission or any part thereof. 
A 
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epitomizing this issue occurred in late 2007, when members of the 
Blackwater Worldwide (Blackwater) private security firm were 
escorting a convoy of State Department personnel through Baghdad.  
At Nisour Square, the Blackwater guards, some of whom claim they 
faced a threat, opened fire on civilians, killing seventeen Iraqis.2  
Public attention continued as five Blackwater employees were 
indicted in December 2008, and the case continued in 2009 until the 
court dismissed the charges due to improper prosecutorial use of the 
guards’ statements.3  Negative Iraqi public perceptions of private 
security contractors continued from 2009 to 2010.4 
As one commentator put it, “the fallout from the September 16 
shooting by Blackwater guards in Baghdad was as publicly damaging 
to U.S. efforts in Iraq as was the My Lai massacre in Vietnam.”5  
Moreover, coverage reminded observers of previous incidents 
involving private contractors, such as Abu Ghraib.6 
This Article analyzes and builds upon the somewhat successful 
steps taken by the Department of Defense and the Department of 
 
2 David H. Chen, Note, Holding “Hired Guns” Accountable: The Legal Status of 
Private Security Contractors in Iraq, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 101, 101 (2009). 
3 See, e.g., Josh Meyer, Blackwater Killings Called Unprovoked: Unsealed Papers 
Reveal Prosecutors’ Claims that Guards Targeted Iraqis in ‘Shocking’ Attack, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Dec. 9, 2008, at A1; Charlie Savage, Charges Voided for Contractors in Iraq 
Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2010, at A1. 
4 Timothy Williams, Iraqis Angered at Dropping of Blackwater Charges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 2, 2010, at A4; Kevin Whitelaw, Use of Private Security Grows in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId 
=113389274. 
5 ROGER D. CARSTENS ET AL., NEW AM. FOUND., CHANGING THE CULTURE OF 
PENTAGON CONTRACTING 9 (2008), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/ 
nafmigration/Changing_the_Culture_of_Pentagon_Contracting.pdf. 
6 See generally Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass 
Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (2005) (discussing how to deter atrocities, including 
those caused by privatized military companies); Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities 
at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 
16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549 (2005) (describing the allegations that contractor personnel 
were involved in the Abu Ghraib abuses and raising concerns about the outsourcing trend 
in the military); Marcy Strauss, The Lessons of Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269 (2005) 
(discussing the Bush administration’s disregard of international legal norms, including the 
Geneva Conventions); Mark W. Bina, Comment, Private Military Contractor Liability and 
Accountability After Abu Ghraib, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1237 (2005) (discussing 
current federal laws, international laws, and cases relevant to the Abu Ghraib scandal); 
Scott J. Borrowman, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and Abu Ghraib—Civil 
Remedies for Victims of Extraterritorial Torts by U.S. Military Personnel and Civilian 
Contractors, 2005 BYU L. REV. 371. 
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State in 2008–2009 to manage the problem.7  Analyzing those steps 
shows a key strand consisting of what may be called the “contract 
law” approach.  In the much-expanded form proposed in this Article, 
the “contract law” approach would use government contract 
requirements, contracting tools and sanctions, contract-related claims, 
and distinctive contract-related suits to both control and remedy 
private security abuses and injuries.  This Article continues my prior 
studies as a professor of government contracting law8 with a specific 
interest in the Iraq war.9 
In Part I, this Article lays out the issue and the previously proposed 
solutions.  The problem of private security abuses and injuries10 is 
part of the broader trend toward the privatizing11 of military effort.12  
 
7 See Walter Pincus, Fatal Shootings by Iraq Contractors Drop in 2008, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 20, 2008, at A9. 
8 See generally CHARLES TIEFER & WILLIAM A. SHOOK, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2006) (providing a broad case study 
of court findings on government contracts).  For the press commentary, see infra notes 
120–21. 
9 See generally Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-
Aided Unilateralism as a Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007) 
(discussing the significance of contracting); Charles Tiefer, Can Appropriation Riders 
Speed Our Exit from Iraq?, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 291 (2006) (discussing the potential 
impact of so-called “appropriation riders” on the war).  Similar treatments of previous 
wars include, e.g., Charles Tiefer, War Decisions in the Late 1990s by Partial 
Congressional Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Tiefer, War 
Decisions]. 
10 J. Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of Civilians 
Accompanying the Armed Forces, 57 A.F. L. REV. 155, 186–200 (2005) (discussing 
deficiencies in the law). 
11 For the background of outsourcing and privatizing, see Gillian E. Metzger, 
Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003), which gives contemporary 
examples of privatization and its implications for current constitutional doctrine; 
Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (2003). 
12 For general discussions of the development of a role for contractors in privatized 
military support, see P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED 
MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003); Deven R. Desai, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: A 
Proposal for a Layered Approach to Regulating Private Military Companies, 39 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 825 (2005); Virginia Newell & Benedict Sheehy, Corporate Militaries and States: 
Actors, Interactions, and Reactions, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 67 (2006), which explores the 
interaction between private military firms and traditional state entities; Clifford J. Rosky, 
Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal 
States, 36 CONN. L. REV 879 (2004); Kristen Fricchione, Comment, Casualties in 
Evolving Warfare: Impact of Private Military Firms’ Proliferation on the International 
Community, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 731 (2005), which discusses the legal and jurisdictional 
ramifications of the increased reliance on private forces; Ellen L. Frye, Note, Private 
Military Firms in the New World Order: How Redefining “Mercenary” Can Tame the 
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This privatization has produced accountability issues13 that reduce 
support for the U.S. government’s efforts both in Iraq14 and in the 
world.15  Some observers discuss applying the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ) via its recent amendment covering private 
security employees.16  Others discuss applying the amended Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Act (MEJA).17  Yet others see the 
solution in civil suits under existing statutes.18 
And Iraqi authorities could also impose sanctions, as shown by 
their failure to license Blackwater in 2009, obliging the firm to 
quickly wind down its operations.19  A 2003 edict of the Coalition 
 
“Dogs of War,” 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2607 (2005), which proposes a more exact 
definition of “mercenary” as a mean of controlling unwanted nonmilitary behavior. 
13 Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the 
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 161–
63 (2005) (exploring alternative theories of international law to address the accountability 
problems of privatization); Keith Hartley, The Economics of Military Outsourcing, 11 
PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 287, 290 (2002); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How 
Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 
46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 989 (2005) (explaining that the lack of transparency in the use of 
private contractors has often led to high-profile scandals). 
14 Private security plays a particularly important role in support of the United States’s 
effort in Iraq, where troop ceilings and practical constraints on American forces created 
dependence on private security for protective roles. 
15 E.L. Gaston, Note, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security 
Industry and Its Implications for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 221, 228 (2008). 
16 For analysis of the amendment applying the UCMJ to contractors, see Cara-Ann M. 
Hamaguchi, Recent Developments, Between War and Peace: Exploring the 
Constitutionality of Subjecting Private Civilian Contractors to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice During “Contingency Operations,” 86 N.C. L. REV. 1047 (2008).  For 
further background on the issue, see David A. Melson, Military Jurisdiction over Civilian 
Contractors: A Historical Overview, 52 NAVAL L. REV. 277 (2005); Wm. C. Peters, On 
Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilian 
Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 BYU L. REV. 367. 
17 Ian W. Baldwin, Note, Comrades in Arms: Using the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice and the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to Prosecute Civilian-Contractor 
Misconduct, 94 IOWA L. REV. 287 (2008); Ian Kierpaul, Comment, The Mad Scramble of 
Congress, Lawyers, and Law Students After Abu Ghraib: The Rush to Bring Private 
Military Contractors to Justice, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 407, 412–23 (2008); Del Quentin 
Wilber, Blackwater Guards Indicted in Deadly Baghdad Shooting, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 
2008, at A3. 
18 Ryan Micallef, Note, Liability Laundering and Denial of Justice: Conflicts Between 
the Alien Tort Statute and the Government Contractor Defense, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1375, 
1375–76 (2006). 
19 Monte Morin, Iraq Rescinds License for Blackwater Security Firm, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 
30, 2009, at A4. 
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Provision Authority (CPA)20 immunizing the contractors had barred 
Iraq from imposing sanctions upon them, but this immunization ended 
with a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in 2009.21 
However, because of practical limitations,22 these alternatives, 
taken alone, may not provide the whole answer. 
Part II addresses the contract law approach to controlling private 
security contracting abuses and injuries.  Soon after the Nisour Square 
incident and continuing years later, the Departments of Defense and 
State implemented important reforms,23 such as new and stricter 
contractual requirements, departmental monitoring of contractor 
performance, and department-wide regulations in July 2009.24 
More could be done to follow up on this contract law approach.  
Government contracting has impressive tools.  Additional contractual 
requirements for private security firms can serve as “quality control” 
 
20 See Coalition Laws and Transition Arrangements During Occupation of Iraq, 98 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 601, 601–06 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2004) [hereinafter Coalition Laws] 
(explaining how international law impacts American practice in areas such as court 
decisions, immunity, criminal law, and the use of force).  For the significance of the CPA 
and its demise, see Adam Roberts, The End of Occupation: Iraq 2004, 54 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 27 (2005).  For the establishment of the Joint Contracting Command in Iraq in 2004, 
see Jack L. Cunnane, The Evolution of Contracting in Iraq March 2003–March 2005, J. 
CONT. MGMT., Summer 2005, at 47 (2005).  For a discussion of the legal challenges in 
legitimizing the U.S. occupation’s approach, see Andrea Carcano, End of the Occupation 
in 2004? The Status of the Multinational Force in Iraq After the Transfer of Sovereignty to 
the Interim Iraqi Government, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 41, 49 (2006), which argues 
that only minimal legitimacy of the government was accomplished; Gregory H. Fox, The 
Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195, 252–54 (2005), which points out the irony of 
the rhetoric adopted by the Security Council; Steven Wheatley, The Security Council, 
Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 531 (2006).  See 
generally Sujit Choudhry, Commentary, Old Imperial Dilemmas and the New Nation-
Building: Constitutive Constitutional Politics in Multinational Polities, 37 CONN. L. REV. 
933 (2005) (discussing the connection between legitimacy and the right to “self-
determination”). 
21 See James Risen, End of Immunity Worries U.S. Contractors in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 1, 2008, at A14. 
22 See, e.g., Heather Carney, Note, Prosecuting the Lawless: Human Rights Abuses and 
Private Military Firms, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 330–44 (2006). 
23 Michael J. Navarre, Departments of State and Defense Sign MOA on Private Security 
Contractors, PROCUREMENT LAW., Spring 2008, at 3, 3. 
24 Elizabeth Newell, Pentagon Lays Out Detailed Regulations for Security Contractors, 
GOV’T EXECUTIVE, July 17, 2009, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0709/071709e1.htm.  
The government gave key tasks to the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), 
which can deploy expert specialists to oversee private security contractor quality control.  
In short, several of the reforms took a distinctly contract-based approach.  These steps 
made use of the contract aspects of private security firms and eschewed a focus solely on 
sanctioning individual employees. 
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specifications.  The Departments of Defense and State may impose 
additional contractual requirements besides training and reporting that 
relate to the selection and assignment of employees,25 postincident 
responsibilities,26 and international licensing and accreditation.  The 
government can treat incidents that cause the inappropriate harming 
of civilians, in addition to potentially prosecutable actions of 
individual employees, as both possible failures of “quality control” by 
the private security firms and occasions for scrutiny by an inspector 
general.27 
Among the category of tools for civilians that have been discussed 
by commentators are different kinds of claims and suits,28 which 
 
25 Mark Calaguas, Military Privatization: Efficiency or Anarchy?, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 58, 79 (2006). 
26 See generally Jeffrey F. Addicott, Contractors on the “Battlefield”: Providing 
Adequate Protection, Anti-Terrorism Training, and Personnel Recovery for Civilian 
Contractors Accompanying the Military in Combat and Contingency Operations, 28 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 323 (2006). 
27 Compare Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on 
Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1983) (discussing the constitutional and 
valuable status of independent inspectors general), with Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. 
Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 
90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 681–82 (2005) (finding that such status impairs executive 
independence). 
28 The U.S. government has elaborate claims mechanisms for injury and damage abroad 
by the military; other foreign claims, in connection with the Status of Forces Agreements, 
include some valuable legal features.  See generally Reetuparna Dutta, Of Embassy 
Guards and Rock Stars: Why the Department of State Should Provide Compensation for 
Torts Committed by Embassy Guards Abroad, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1279 (2008); 
Gregory A. McClelland, The Problem of Jurisdiction over Civilians Accompanying the 
Forces Overseas—Still with Us, 117 MIL. L. REV. 153 (1987); Aurel Sari, Status of Forces 
and Status of Mission Agreements Under the ESDP: The EU’s Evolving Practice, 19 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 67 (2008); David P. Stephenson, An Introduction to the Payment of Claims 
Under the Foreign and International Agreement Claims Act, 37 A.F. L. REV. 191 (1994); 
Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Note, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of the 
Government Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 365 (2006). 
 A related approach involves using the False Claims Act (FCA).  Jeffrey S. Palmer, 
Claims Encountered During an Operational Contingency, 42 A.F. L. REV. 227, 231 
(1997) (“The use of the FCA can be a genuinely effective tool to maintain good relations 
with the local population in which a military force is often immersed.”).  For the use of the 
FCA generally in the Iraq War, see Abigail H. Avery, Commentary, Weapons of Mass 
Construction: The Potential Liability of Halliburton Under the False Claims Act and the 
Implications to Defense Contracting, 57 ALA. L. REV. 827 (2006); M.M. Harris, 
Commentary, Patriots and Profiteers: Combating False Claims by Contractors in the Iraq 
War and Reconstruction, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1227 (2008). 
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already apply to the military in Iraq29 but apparently not to the 
contractors.30  As for civil suits, most interestingly, the civilian 
victims of security incidents may be able to invoke such contract 
requirements as third-party beneficiaries under a contract law 
theory.31  The intricacies of third-party beneficiaries of government 
contracts32 may support an argument that civilians have rights as to 
security contractors in Iraq.33 
The Article’s Conclusion will look at these issues in the context of 
critiques of global34 privatization.35  This draws on my prior work on 
legal aspects of wars, from serving as General Counsel of the House 
of Representatives for the investigation of the Iran-Contra affair36 to 
conducting analyses of the Persian Gulf War37 and other 1990s 
 
29 See generally Jerrett W. Dunlap, Jr., The Economic Efficiency of the Army’s 
Maneuver Damage Claims Program: Coase, but No Cigar, 190/91 MIL. L. REV. 1 
(2006/2007). 
30 See Karin Tackaberry, Judge Advocates Play a Major Role in Rebuilding Iraq: The 
Foreign Claims Act and Implementation of the Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program, ARMY LAW., Feb. 2004, at 39; Jonathan Tracy, Responsibility to Pay: 
Compensating Civilian Casualties of War, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Fall 2007, at 16. 
31 See generally David M. Summers, Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 880 (1982) (discussing the legal 
theory and implications of the third-party beneficiary aspect of contract law). 
32 Recent Case, Martinez v. Socoma Companies, Inc., Cal., 1974, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
646 (1975); Robert S. Adelson, Note, Third Party Beneficiary and Implied Right of Action 
Analysis: The Fiction of One Governmental Intent, 94 YALE L.J. 875, 875 (1985). 
33 This policy resembles the policy behind the “Iraqi First” program for giving more 
contract work to local contractors.  Both use government contracting to build local 
goodwill.  For a discussion of the “Iraqi First” program, see Bradley A. Cleveland, The 
Last Shall Be First: The Use of Localized Socio-Economic Policies in Contingency 
Contracting Operations, 197 MIL. L. REV. 103 (2008). 
34 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Outsourcing Is Not Our Only Problem, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1216 (2008) (reviewing PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: 
WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND 
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2007)). 
35 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
543 (2000); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 
89 CAL. L. REV. 569 (2001); Metzger, supra note 11. 
36 As Special Deputy Chief Counsel on the House’s Iran-Contra Committee, the author 
cowrote the chapter in the committee report on the Boland Amendments.  REPORT OF THE 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. 
NO. 100-433, S. REP. NO. 100-216, at 395 (1987).  For a discussion drawing on that 
service, see George W. Van Cleve & Charles Tiefer, Navigating the Shoals of “Use” 
Immunity and Secret International Enterprises in Major Congressional Investigations: 
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 55 MO. L. REV. 43 (1990). 
37 See CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY: THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING WITHOUT CONGRESS 119–34 (1994) 
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conflicts.38  The new problem of private security contractors 
encountered in Iraq represents a larger problem that will occur in the 
conflicts of the future, both American and other.  Solutions worked 
out in Iraq, including the utilization of contract law tools, may serve 
in these future conflicts. 
I 
THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS AND THE LIMITS OF 
OTHER PROPOSALS 
A.  Background 
Peter W. Singer, the leading scholar of private military firms 
(PMFs), has chronicled the rapid global rise of PMFs in recent 
decades.39  As he explains, PMFs differ from individuals practicing 
their trade either in the past or at present: “[I]t is the corporatization 
of military service provision that sets them apart.”40  Moreover, one 
of the many trends in the 1990s that brought this industry to 
unprecedented levels consisted of a generally occurring “privatization 
revolution.”  Private companies outsourced their security needs, and 
governments privatized some of the support for their militaries.41  
This trend begins to suggest why solutions oriented toward individual 
employees, such as prosecution, might be usefully supplemented by 
government contracting tools.  The government does not hire 
individuals to support its military, it hires a “corporatized” military 
service elaborately organized and structured to seek, obtain, and 
perform contracts as firms do. 
As late as the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the U.S. military still 
made only limited use of contractors.  Significant growth in their role 
 
(stating that the Persian Gulf War marked a climax of the push-and-pull dynamic between 
Congress and the presidency during wartime). 
38 See Charles Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton Administration and 
Congressional Procedure, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 199 (1998) (examining congressional 
oversight of agencies since the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act).  This 
oversight includes Bosnia, see generally Tiefer, War Decisions, supra note 9 (harmonizing 
the formalistic distaste toward “partial” declarations and the practical effect of such acts), 
and Kosovo, Charles Tiefer, Book Review, 96 AM J. INT’L L. 489 (2002) (reviewing 
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM 
AFTER KOSOVO (2001)). 
39 SINGER, supra note 12, at 3–49; see also DEBORAH D. AVANT, THE MARKET FOR 
FORCE: THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATIZING SECURITY 7–22 (2005). 
40 SINGER, supra note 12, at 45. 
41 Id. at 66–70. 
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occurred in the next dozen years, but not evenly in all sectors.  The 
greatest expansion of their role occurred in Iraq.  Singer usefully 
divides contractors into the following groups: those that provide 
support, such as the KBR firm; those that provide consulting; and the 
“military provider firms” that provide, among other services, armed 
security.  At the peak of their service, of the estimated 180,000 
contractor employees serving in Iraq, up to 30,000 were armed 
security contractors “who carry guns and perform quasi-military 
roles.”42  For the State Department, the contractors’ work consists 
primarily of protective escort service for state officials and protective 
service for some offices away from Baghdad.  For the Defense 
Department, their work includes protecting convoys, providing 
protective escort service for groups such as the Army Corps of 
Engineers, and providing some fixed-location protective service. 
Some critics would describe the role of those 30,000 security 
contractors as holding down troop levels in Iraq—a role resulting 
from the determination of the U.S. government, notably former 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  That is, in order to keep 
down the number of troops needed, his solution was to hire security 
contractors to do some armed tasks that would otherwise have 
required troops. 
Another way to describe the role of security contractors, which 
reflects their potential for future use, is that they perform tasks during 
a limited wartime period that would otherwise require undue 
permanent swelling of government employment.  For example, 
elsewhere in the world, the State Department handles the limited need 
for protection of its officers by utilizing agents in the Diplomatic 
Security Service (DS).  To do the same in Iraq would require a very 
large increase in the total number of agents in the DS.  In 2003, the 
State Department would have found this very hard to arrange on short 
notice given the high standards of the DS, the challenge of 
recruitment, and the training of the agents.  It would also create the 
problem of determining what to do with the additional DS agents, 
expanded during temporary wartime, once peace or disengagement 
comes in Iraq.43 
 
42 Jonathan Finer, Recent Developments, Holstering the Hired Guns: New 
Accountability Measures for Private Security Contractors, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 259, 260 
(2008). 
43 That is not to gainsay what legal commentators, including some with solid military 
credentials, have said about the downside of dependence upon private security, but the 
topic is beyond this Article’s scope.  Whatever the scope of private security in the future, 
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B.  Nisour Square Incident 
The private contractor problem that developed in Iraq consisted of 
incidents during which private security killed or injured civilians.  
Although many such incidents occurred, the problem came to a 
dramatic peak in Nisour Square on September 16, 2007.  In a 
congested intersection in Baghdad, contractors in one vehicle of a 
Blackwater convoy of four vehicles became convinced, probably 
mistakenly, that they were threatened.  It is alleged that the private 
security in each of the four vehicles opened heavy fire with machine 
guns on the street filled with civilians, leaving seventeen Iraqis dead 
and more than twenty wounded.44 
The Nisour Square incident brought an outpouring of accumulated 
Iraqi anger at the United States’s private security.  It triggered a major 
diplomatic crisis between the U.S. and Iraqi governments.  The 
diplomatic crisis persisted and became one of the components of a 
major and lengthy difficulty in concluding a SOFA to legalize U.S. 
forces’ operations in Iraq going forward.  A press firestorm ensued, as 
American and world journalists alike brought to light many 
controversial aspects of this incident and of previous private security 
incidents, highlighting many larger dimensions of the problem.  A 
number of congressional hearings occurred, focusing attention on the 
inadequate legal tools for dealing with the problem. 
Part of the U.S. government’s response to the crisis consisted of 
investigating the Nisour Square incident for possible prosecution.  
However, as time went on without charges, increasing amounts of 
commentary emerged—in the press, in hearings, and ultimately in law 
reviews—about the legal difficulties of prosecution and how else to 
deal with the problem. 
C.  UCMJ, MEJA, and Iraqi Law 
The UCMJ is the code and the criminal process by which the 
military itself, as distinct from private contractors, maintains 
discipline, including discipline for the wrongful killing of civilians.  
 
the question remains how to deal with contractor abuses and injuries.  See, e.g., Thurnher, 
infra note 67. 
44  Sudarsan Raghavan, Iraqi Probe Faults Blackwater Guards: 17 People Killed 
Without Provocation at Baghdad Square, Officials Conclude, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2007, 
at A12.  There are countless journalistic accounts.  The account by the Iraqi government 
has significance both as a factual account and as an indication of the Iraqi government’s 
reaction.  Id. 
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The UCMJ governs courts-martial and military commissions.  Until 
late 2006, the UCMJ did not even theoretically cover private security 
contractors in Iraq.  UCMJ application received a narrow 
interpretation in light of the caution exhibited by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in extending the reach of courts-martial.45  In particular during 
the Vietnam War, courts interpreted the UCMJ’s application to 
civilians only in “time of war” as requiring a declaration of war.46  
When Congress enacted its authorization for the use of force in Iraq in 
2002, the legislature legitimated almost all of what a declaration of 
war would.  However, pursuant to judicial precedent, that 
authorization did not activate the UCMJ coverage of civilians that 
would accompany the force “in time of war.” 
Reacting to some of the pre-Nisour Square incidents, Senator 
Lindsey Graham (R-SC) proposed, and Congress enacted, an 
amendment to the UCMJ extending military jurisdiction, in time of a 
contingency operation or declared war, to persons accompanying or 
serving with an armed force in the field.47  Constitutional challenges 
may occur in response to the trial of civilian contractors by courts-
martial.  But a careful study concluded that the courts would uphold 
the amendment.48 
Still, a number of practical problems stand in the way of applying 
the UCMJ, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has made little or 
no use of the new provision.  The DOD did not seek the amendment.  
Military courts may find this particular exercise of their jurisdiction 
somewhat misaligned with the normal exercise.49  Unlike troops, 
private security contractors are not under military discipline and are 
not ordinarily acting under the orders of combat commanders. 
Turning to MEJA, Congress enacted this statute in 2000 
specifically to bring overseas military contractor employees under the 
criminal jurisdiction of U.S. courts, after a scandal during the military 
 
45 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
46 United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363, 365 (1970). 
47 John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 
109-364, § 552, 120 Stat. 2083, 2217 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 
802(a)(10) (2006)). 
48 Hamaguchi, supra note 16, at 1064–66. 
49 It is true that security employees performing personal security details often formerly 
served in the U.S. armed forces and that the charges could be similar to the types brought 
against soldiers.  However, an important part of courts-martial for misconduct in the 
employment of force consists of maintaining military discipline and obedience to the 
orders of combat commanders. 
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intervention in the Balkans.50  After Abu Ghraib, it became apparent 
that the statute did not apply to contractors that were not technically 
hired under a DOD contract, even when they performed work with the 
military and the non-DOD contract was just a technicality.51  So, 
Congress amended the law to reach contractors “supporting the 
mission of the DOD.”52  The Defense Department issued proposed 
regulations for implementing MEJA as to that department.53 
Practical problems hinder the pursuit of cases under MEJA also.  
No department other than the DOD adopted implementing 
regulations.  The Nisour Square incident involved a State Department 
contractor, not a DOD contractor.54  On the other hand, the 
Department of Justice secured an indictment of five Blackwater 
guards in the Nisour Square incident pursuant to MEJA.55 
Whatever the technical issues of applying MEJA to non-DOD 
contractors, criminal indictments under MEJA seem unlikely to 
become common.  It is true that even a small number of successful 
prosecutions can have a strong deterrent effect, as well as propitiating 
the local indignation about abuses.  Still, there are enormous practical 
and legal problems with bringing so many criminal prosecutions in 
federal courts about actions in a war zone that will shape corporate 
behavior.56 
 
50 Some employees of the contractor then holding the Logistics Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP) contract, Dyncorp International (one of the three contractors later providing 
security for the State Department in Iraq), were involved in sex trafficking.  However, they 
were outside federal criminal jurisdiction.  In response, Congress enacted the original 
MEJA.  Kierpaul, supra note 17, at 416–17. 
51 Fredrick A. Stein, Have We Closed the Barn Door Yet? A Look at the Current 
Loopholes in the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 27 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 579, 598–
602 (2005). 
52 Kierpaul, supra note 17, at 417. 
53 Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilians Employed by or Accompanying the Armed 
Forces Outside the United States, Service Members, and Former Service Members, 70 
Fed. Reg. 75,998 (Dec. 22, 2005) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 153 (2009)). 
54 There was some doubt about how to interpret the phrase “supporting the mission of 
the DOD”; although the State Department and the Defense Department ostensibly have 
common goals in Iraq, a State Department contractor in Iraq, it was asserted, did not 
support the DOD’s mission.  A general counsel opinion determined that such State 
Department contractors did not support the DOD’s mission. 
55 Tara Lee, MESA for Street Crimes, Not War Crimes, DEPAUL RULE L.J., Aug. 2009, 
at 6. 
56 Even years after MEJA, it appeared that only one successful prosecution of a DOD 
contractor occurred under the law, and that action had nothing to do with private security.  
See id. at 5–6. 
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As for Iraqi laws, these were blocked from use by an edict of the 
CPA.57  This block remained in effect from 2003, when it was 
adopted by the CPA58 at the moment when a U.N. Security Council 
resolution backed the transition to a sovereign Iraqi government,59 
until 2009, when the Iraqi government adopted a new agreement with 
the United States.60  Application of Iraq’s laws represented something 
of a wild card in the potential for criminal prosecution of individual 
contractor employees.61  And the first Iraqi action was to oust 
Blackwater by denying it a license, as discussed above. 
In any event, it is suggested that the application of Iraq’s laws has 
its limitations.  The Iraqi courts could attempt prosecutions against 
individual contractor employees.  Those prosecutions certainly 
matter, but full-scale reform of corporate action requires something 
different.62  Very likely the Iraqi courts will have more interest in 
criminal prosecutions that provide visible retribution and punishment 
than in civil cases—particularly slow, elaborate ones—to dissect and 
reform corporate conduct.63 
In sum, without denying that there can be merit in each of these 
approaches, they need supplementation.  They apply much more 
potently to employees than to the security contracting firms.  These 
approaches attempt to treat a contracting problem without using 
contract law tools.  This Article now turns to those tools. 
 
57 Coalition Laws, supra note 20, at 601–02. 
58 See id. at 602. 
59 Id. at 603–04. 
60 Risen, supra note 21. 
61 On the one hand, the Iraqi desire for justice stemming from incidents of abuse by 
contractor employees, who behaved as though above the law, can be understood.  The 
Iraqi government pressed hard in the negotiations over the agreement to end immunity for 
contractors, reflecting general Iraqi sentiment.  On the other hand, contractor employees 
must, by their contractual assignment, sometimes use deadly force in defensive measures 
against Iraqi insurgents who attack those whom the contractors protect.  Such employees 
may have concerns that an Iraqi court will not act objectively when civilians get caught in 
cross fire, even in legitimately handled defensive incidents. 
62 Iraqi courts will not likely attempt to try civil cases, with the aspects and nuances of 
such cases, by using the American style of delving into the inner planning and 
arrangements of contractor firms.  The contractor firms have extensive resources for 
responding to such suits. 
63 And the Iraqi courts will lack the leverage of the class action mechanism, the 
potential for expansive remedies, and discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure regarding the roles of firms in not preventing incidents. 
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II 
CONTROLLING PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS 
When the firestorm broke in the press after the Nisour Square 
incident, the Departments of Defense and State took action 
concerning government contracting; action that has gone largely 
unanalyzed legally.  This Article turns to the thus far unused or 
underutilized tools of controlling government contracting after 
considering the steps taken by the Departments of Defense and State. 
A.  Steps Taken by the Department of Defense and the State 
Department 
After the Nisour Square incident and other incidents publicized in 
its wake, a worldwide press firestorm ensued.  In fact, the Iraqi 
government itself took such umbrage at these incidents that it would 
not complete the process of issuing a license to Blackwater, and the 
issue became a significant problem in the talks with the United States 
over a SOFA.  The Iraqi reaction exemplifies the reason why the 
United States pursues its policy of restraining private security 
contractors from harming Iraqi civilians.64  Only by benefiting Iraqi 
civilians can the U.S. government accomplish its objective—to 
prevent or reduce the intense anticontractor and anti-U.S. reactions 
undermining the government’s counterinsurgency efforts. 
In October 2007, the State Department’s “Kennedy Panel” 
provided the government with a report (Kennedy Report) containing 
recommendations about the Nisour Square incident.65  The ensuing 
developments were reviewed in a report by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO Report).66  Before then, in the early 
years of the Iraq conflict, the State Department had taken only limited 
 
64 U.S. Congress and Administration Consider Responses to Excessive Uses of Force by 
U.S. Security Firms, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 161, 161–62 (John R. Crook ed., 2008). 
65 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE’S PANEL ON PERSONAL 
PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN IRAQ (2007) [hereinafter KENNEDY REPORT], available at 
http://www.expose-the-war-profiteers.org/archive/government/2007-2/20071023.pdf.  The 
panel credited with authoring the report was chaired by Patrick F. Kennedy, subsequently 
Under Secretary of State for Administration.  For a discussion of the Kennedy Report, see 
Navarre, supra note 23, at 3. 
66 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-966, REBUILDING IRAQ: DOD AND 
STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE IMPROVED OVERSIGHT AND COORDINATION OF PRIVATE 
SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ, BUT FURTHER ACTIONS ARE NEEDED TO SUSTAIN 
IMPROVEMENTS (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d08966.pdf. 
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steps to revise its operating procedures to account for the role of 
private security contractors.67  By December 2007, the State 
Department formally implemented new procedures based on the 
Kennedy Report through a series of directives.68 
The Kennedy Report’s recommendations included that “[w]hen the 
FBI investigation into the September 16, 2007, incident is completed, 
the Embassy should submit its recommendation as to whether the 
continued services of the contractor involved [i.e., Blackwater] is 
consistent with the accomplishment of the overall United States 
mission in Iraq.”69  In essence, this is perhaps the most classic of 
government contract law approaches—to consider, after the criminal 
investigation is done, terminating the contract. 
In the period of 2004 to 2007, the DOD had already taken steps to 
revise its contract rules to match the new reality of a large supporting 
role by private security contractors.70  Nisour Square kicked that 
effort into a much higher gear.  The DOD implemented new 
procedures, through a formal military order (DOD Order),71 and the 
State Department and the DOD entered into a memorandum of 
agreement.72  As the GAO Report explained, the post-Nisour Square 
DOD Order emphasizes the role of the contracting officer 
representative,73 who is traditionally responsible for the contract law 
approach of monitoring how the contractor performs a contract.  “The 
order further states that contracting officers are responsible for 
monitoring PSC [Private Security Contractor] performance and 
ensuring PSC compliance with contractual requirements.”74 
Also, the Under Secretary of the DOD responsible for procurement 
delegated authority to Iraq’s military contracting command to be 
“responsible for all contract administration for the DOD’s security 
contracts in Iraq.”75  In turn, “[i]n Iraq, [the Joint Contracting 
 
67 Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Drowning in Blackwater: How Weak Accountability over Private 
Security Contractors Significantly Undermines Counterinsurgency Efforts, ARMY LAW., 
July 2008, at 64, 78–79. 
68 GAO REPORT, supra note 66, at 19. 
69 KENNEDY REPORT, supra note 65, at 8. 
70 Thurnher, supra note 67, at 73–75. 
71 Specifically, this is Fragmentary Order 07-428. GAO REPORT, supra note 66, at 12. 
72 Id. at 19–20. 
73 Id. at 14. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 15.  The precise terminology is that the Under Secretary of Defense, 
Acquisition Technology and Logistics delegated this authority to the Joint Contracting 
Command–Iraq/Afghanistan.  Id. 
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Command-Iraq/Afghanistan] has delegated to DCMA [the Defense 
Contract Management Agency] the responsibility to provide contract 
administration over private security contracts.”76 
This had strong implications for what this Article has previously 
described as the “quality assurance” aspects of private security 
contracting.  “DCMA officials told us that this approach . . . includes 
developing a quality assurance framework, a key component of which 
is the agency’s development of a series of quality assurance checklists 
for PSCs.”77  This allows the DOD to audit the contracting firms not 
merely as to finances, but as to any and all contractual requirements 
placed upon them to prevent, mitigate, or compensate for abuses and 
injuries, such as inappropriately harming civilians.  It creates the 
administrative structure for the contract law approach to private 
security contracting.  In detail, officials of the DCMA indicated that 
the checklists have been developed by incorporating requirements 
from the statements of work in PSC contracts and current MNF-I 
[coalition command] guidance and fragmentary orders and 
translating these requirements into objective measurable standards 
intended to enable the agency to conduct regular and unbiased 
inspections of contracting personnel, known as surveillance audits.  
According to DCMA officials, these checklists are intended to 
ensure that PSCs are meeting contract requirements and that DOD 
is providing appropriate oversight over the contracts.  The 
checklists translate security contract requirements into an audit 
document.78 
The DOD and the State Department also implemented other 
significant steps to address the problem, some unrelated to contract 
law, some indirectly related.  For example, the DOD created an 
Armed Contractor Oversight Division and an incident review board.  
These organizations would mostly implement practical measures 
unrelated to contract law, such as gathering information about what 
certain contractors did, where they were, and what incidents occurred.  
Some of the other significant steps, however, could work indirectly 
through contracting.  The new organizations could arrange additional 
rules, which would then be implemented through contract law and 
administration. 
 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  For the sake of completeness, the GAO expressed doubt that the DCMA had 
enough personnel to carry out this procedure for long.  See id. at 16–17. 
 2009] No More Nisour Squares 761 
The importance of this approach, as a basis for a contract law 
concept, should not be underestimated.  This approach works through 
contract-based rules, through contract-based monitoring and auditing, 
and, at least potentially, through contract-based sanctioning.  
Moreover, this approach supplements whatever interactions occur that 
involve individual security employees who act wrongly with an 
elaborate contract-based web of interactions between government 
contract managers and the contracting firms.  Such an institutional 
approach has great potential to prevent, mitigate, and compensate for 
abuses and injuries by obliging contracting firms to improve their 
operations, rather than just punishing individuals. 
B.  Using Contract Law Tools 
The DOD used its new contract law tools to impose important 
training and reporting requirements.79  More could be done to follow 
up this key approach.80  Additional contractual requirements for 
private security firms could serve as a “quality control” specification, 
an increasingly important aspect of government contracting.81  For 
example, these requirements could relate to the selection and 
assignment of employees82 and the international vetting and licensing 
of the firms.83 
The private security field has both a range of employee 
backgrounds and a range of duties.  Some employees formerly 
worked for special forces units in the military, with good records.  
Some formerly worked for regular units in the military or for 
domestic police forces, with good records.  Some may not have such 
good records.  Vetting the third-party nationals who work in such 
firms is much more complex.84  And, increasingly in recent years, 
Iraqis themselves have been potential hires.  Conversely, the duties 
 
79 See Thurnher, supra note 67, at 82–83. 
80 See CARSTENS ET AL., supra note 5, at 7 (“[T]he government should also . . . 
[i]mprove training for security contractors and the vetting of third-country nationals [and] 
[e]ncourage third-party accreditation of all security contractors . . . .”). 
81 See, e.g., Thomas J. Kelleher, Jr. & Veronica J. Cherniak, Inspection Under Fixed-
Price Construction Contracts/Edition II, BRIEFING PAPERS, June 1996, at 1, 7. 
82 See Calaguas, supra note 25, at 79. 
83 See Thurnher, supra note 67, at 88. 
84 CARSTENS ET AL., supra note 5, at 11 (“The government should . . . [i]nstitute better 
vetting procedures regarding third-country and local-country nationals to ensure that those 
with criminal pasts (and particularly those guilty of human rights abuses) are prevented 
from serving as security contractors . . . .”). 
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for these employees range from providing security for high-value 
targets (e.g., American officials) in challenging urban areas to convoy 
duty to static protection duty, particularly in relatively quiet locales. 
Contract law offers different methods to obtain additional qualities.  
These methods could be mandated as requirements.  For example, to 
perform the highest level of duties, the rules incorporated in the 
contract could require particular sets of backgrounds for selected 
contractors. 
Alternatively, the government could evaluate the firm’s additional 
attributes when deciding upon awarding contracts or task orders.  
Ordinarily, such awards may occur on a basis that does not fully 
gauge or reward quality, such as a lowest price offer that is 
technically acceptable.  Instead, awards could occur on a basis that 
does gauge and reward quality.  Awards could occur on a “best value” 
basis with a trade-off that puts the most weight on quality criteria and 
puts only limited weight on cost.85  Moreover, as successive awards 
of such contracts occur, the government could give weight in the later 
awards to the “past performance” on the early awards.  Private 
security contractors may well argue that it is a hard challenge to avoid 
casualties to everyone under their protection, while at the same time 
completely avoiding casualties to local civilians.  Counting “past 
performance” would reward those contractors who perform the best at 
those double challenges. 
Similarly, a contract law approach may deal with postincident 
responsibilities.86  For example, the government could require firms 
to transfer individual employees involved in any incidents to less-
demanding duties (e.g., from mobile convoy duty to static perimeter 
duty, either temporarily or for the duration of the contract).  This 
could occur for individual employees implicated either in dubious 
judgment significantly below the criminal level or in multiple 
instances of near-dubious judgment. 
Apart from stepping up the requirements and the basis for 
awarding contracts, the government has powerful tools that it could 
employ for dealing with contractor shortfalls.  Both Defense and State 
Departments have inspectors general (IGs) that could follow up 
 
85 2 STEVEN W. FELDMAN, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT AWARDS: NEGOTIATION AND 
SEALED BIDDING § 12:4 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2009). 
86 See generally Addicott, supra note 26. 
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security incidents by auditing or investigating private security firms 
for flawed quality control.87 
Before Nisour Square, and to some extent even after the event, 
some IGs did not see private contractor incidents as involving 
contract law issues.  IGs could determine that incidents warranted 
some scrutiny by a criminal investigator but, apart from that, IGs had 
little or no role.  However, the contract law approach lays the 
foundation for a much larger role for IGs.  Now, the DOD would be 
rendering quality assurance requirements subject to audit.  By 
creating much fuller incident reporting requirements, a contract law 
approach can establish a paper trail to monitor contractors, 
simultaneously with interview and other live evidence, to determine 
the actual quality of the firms’ employees.  This partly concerns 
whether IGs see the subject in all its seriousness.  They must not leave 
private security quality control to the DCMA after dangerous 
incidents have occurred.  IG involvement sends a powerful message 
that is hard to send through other means, much like the message sent 
within police departments when weapon discharge incidents are 
investigated seriously.  Contractors disinclined to take reporting 
requirements seriously would view the matter very differently when 
IGs scrutinize failures to make full disclosures or otherwise cooperate 
fully in inquiries. 
Moreover, IGs should have a degree of independence that others in 
the particular department may lack.  For example, it is common, and 
perhaps natural, that officials working with a particular security 
contracting firm come to bond with it.88  Natural as that bonding is, it 
does not make for an independent judgment of whether the contractor 
has fulfilled all requirements, including those relating to sparing local 
civilians from injury.  An independent IG has a better chance of 
making an independent judgment. 
Furthermore, an IG investigation could justify serious legal 
sanctions, contestable by the contractors if they so choose.  These 
could include nonrenewing contractual option terms or partially or 
wholly terminating a contract for convenience.  That, in itself, would 
not preclude the contractor from seeking more contracts.  However, 
the sanctions in the most serious cases could go further, starting with 
 
87 See sources cited supra note 27. 
88 After all, the contractor employees provide both security and an atmosphere of 
protection that are vital to the protected individuals’ sense of security.  Moreover, the 
contractor employees may repeatedly risk their own lives to provide that protection.  The 
“customers” naturally develop loyalty to the employees of a particular security firm. 
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adding negative ratings for past performance to the contractor’s 
record and, much more seriously, terminating a contract for default.89 
These steps do make it harder, sometimes much harder, for the 
contractor to seek more contracts.  The steps may even constitute a 
substantial threat to a firm’s existence if it has nowhere else, other 
than the U.S. government, to turn to sell its services.  But, these tools 
should be available in case an investigation uncovers a particularly 
bad problem.  Moreover, contract law can reduce the impact on the 
government of an interruption of the provision of services when the 
government terminates a contract.  Even under existing law, the 
government can take control of subcontracts and of work in progress 
during the termination of a contract.  It would not be much of an 
extension for private security in a country like Iraq to provide via 
contract provisions or applicable orders that, during termination of a 
contract, the government has full authority to order the shifting of 
firm employees in the theater of combat to a different contractor 
(subject to the employees’ choice rights), similar to the process when 
the government shifts subcontracts. 
An adjustment process would then address any further necessary 
changes.  Issues that may arise during this process could include 
government doubts about particular retained employees who worked 
under the terminated contract, objections made by retained employees 
to continue working for the new contractor, or claims by the 
terminated contractor that the government owes it equitable 
adjustments for its expenditures to recruit and train the retained 
employees.  Just as the procedures for contract termination have 
traditionally been undertaken,90 such contract tools would deal with 
the major problem encountered in this context of actual or perceived 
dependence upon particular security contractors by the government.  
A procedure for a new contractor retaining the terminated contract’s 
employees would respect loyalty,91 without dependence. 
 
89 For a discussion of these termination steps, see TIEFER & SHOOK, supra note 8. 
90 For an introduction to the management of contract terminations, see Paul J. Seidman 
& David J. Seidman, Maximizing Termination for Convenience Settlements/Edition II–
Part I, BRIEFING PAPERS, Feb. 2008, at 1. 
91 Many military and civilian personnel naturally feel strong loyalty to the particular 
security employees who serve and protect them, sometimes at risk to the employees’ lives.  
But that loyalty goes to the guards individually or as a group, not to the entity of the 
private contracting firm. 
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C.  Private Claims and Suits 
1.  The ATCA 
Wrongfully harmed civilians can file private suits in U.S. courts.  
Several victims of abuse involving contractors at Abu Ghraib filed 
such suits.  Commentators have understandably seen an important 
role for such suits, particularly when filed under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act (ATCA).92  Such suits have real potential for application 
to the conflict in Iraq following the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,93 which found federal court jurisdiction 
existed for suits by aliens involving conduct in a foreign country.94  
The use of the political question doctrine by contractors as a defense 
has not proved a grave problem.95  While contractors do have the 
government contractor defense available to them, that too is not 
insuperable.96 
On the other hand, the ATCA only applies to violations of the law 
of nations,97 a level beyond a substantial fraction of the incidents 
involving private security contractors.  More important, when a 
plaintiff actually brought a claim under the ATCA, a federal court 
dismissed the case because the court felt the Act applies only to state 
actors, not private contractors.98  The same or similar problems 
plague other bases for suit, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act and 
so-called Bivens actions.99 
There are counterarguments that such statutes or approaches do 
provide a remedy for the most serious incidents, such as Nisour 
Square or, if they do not provide a remedy, that they should be 
 
92 See generally Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on 
Terrorism, 19 EMORY INT’L  L. REV. 105 (2005); Borrowman, supra note 6; Laura N. 
Pennelle, Comment, The Guantanamo Gap: Can Foreign Nationals Obtain Redress for 
Prolonged Arbitrary Detention and Torture Suffered Outside the United States?, 36 CAL. 
W. INT’L L.J. 303 (2006); Atif Rehman, Note, The Court of Last Resort: Seeking Redress 
for Victims of Abu-Ghraib Torture Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 493 (2006). 
93 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
94 Id. at 714. 
95 See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2005). 
96 See Rakowsky, supra note 28, at 389–98. 
97 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 699. 
98 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56 (D.D.C. 2006). 
99 Borrowman, supra note 6, at 423–25 (discussing these difficulties and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics). 
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broadened.100  A federal lawsuit can provide a great deal.101  
However, whatever the potential for such suits, these actions could 
use, like prosecutions, supplementation by a contract law approach.  
They face major legal barriers, they proceed slowly, and they do not 
apply to occasions involving injuries to civilians without wrongful 
abuse, such as incidents during which civilians are shot in cross fire 
by contractors legitimately protecting officials from real and deadly 
insurgent attacks.102 
2.  Claims 
The United States already has elaborate statutory mechanisms for 
processing claims for injury or damage by the military.  This scheme 
has operated throughout the world, particularly with the worldwide 
system of military units stationed in bases, which began during the 
Cold War, producing claims as a result of everything from traffic 
accidents to the incidental effects of military maneuvers.  This claims 
system has actually operated in Iraq, principally for claims arising 
under the Foreign Claims Act (FCA).  As of 2006, 19,000 claims had 
been resolved in Iraq, with a payout of over $19 million.  Individuals, 
such as Iraqi civilians, with injuries or damage caused by the U.S. 
military file claims with or without local Iraqi legal assistance.  
Military units have Judge Advocates General to resolve the claims. 
Traditionally and significantly, claims are resolved locally and 
under local law—not in the United States, and not under U.S. law.  
Also, payment of a claim does not require a finding of abuse or fault 
by the military personnel; it suffices that injury or damage is caused 
by them, without the need to find fault with how they acted.  At its 
best, these rules produce a sense in the local population of equity and 
fairness concerning the handling of claims, eliminating, or at least 
mitigating, what could otherwise become a major source of ill will 
against the United States.  An Iraqi civilian or family member could 
file a claim simply with evidence of injury caused by American 
 
100 See id. at 424. 
101 That includes authoritative judicial rulings that make binding law for the future, 
discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the roles of firms in 
not preventing incidents, the class action mechanism, and the potential for expansive 
remedies. 
102 Moreover, whatever the potential for such suits—particularly when the government 
does not take reforming steps—the contract law approach serves as a supplement with 
very powerful tools available to the government but not the courts, such as the adoption of 
new rules and orders implemented through contractual provisions. 
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contractors and, perhaps, with a written statement or affidavit to show 
the alleged victim was not regarded as an insurgent.  The claimant 
would not need to allege culpability in the matter, but simply 
injury.103 
The claims system has its flaws.  Jonathan Tracy, who served in 
the Army as a Judge Advocate General from 2002 to 2005, offered a 
powerful criticism.  The FCA, by its terms, only allows claims for 
“noncombat” activity.104  As the United States has done in past 
conflicts since Vietnam, it implemented an additional payment 
program.  In Iraq, those payments came as “condolence payments” 
from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) fund, 
but were sometimes treated as low priority and kept small.105 
Currently, the claims system addresses claims against the United 
States and its personnel, not private contractors.  There have been 
published reports about offers of condolence payments in some 
contractor incidents, but not systematically.  As another alternative, 
there could also be a bilateral U.S.-Iraqi claims commission in the 
wake of the SOFA.  Regardless of these alternatives, it is worth 
describing how a contract law-based claims system would have 
functioned with incidents from 2003 onward. 
The U.S. government could implement a contractor claims system 
with regulations, orders, and contract provisions, requiring contractors 
to participate.  This system could authorize the relevant Judge 
Advocate to receive and to resolve claims by Iraqi civilians against 
contractors.  As with Foreign Claims Act claims, the Judge Advocate 
would decide these claims locally, under local law, and without the 
need to find abuse or fault.106 
 
103 For example, the civilian would be entitled to payment even if the injury resulted 
from a shooting by a contractor made in reasonable action during an exchange of fire with 
insurgents.  The decision on a claim would be separate from any internal government 
decision regarding whether the shooting nevertheless reflected contractor flaws.  The 
gravamen of the claim is injury without regard to wrongful abuse. 
104 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2006). 
105 Tracy noted several problems, including: “payments for every death, injury, or 
property damage incident are limited to $2,500,” which was so low that it “leaves 
survivors bitter and frustrated with the United States[,] . . . [c]ommanders prioritize CERP 
funds for reconstruction projects . . . at the expense of condolence payments[,] . . . [and] 
the rules governing condolence payments are ad hoc.”  Tracy, supra note 30, at 18. 
106 An interesting question, which need not be resolved, concerns when or under what 
circumstances a private security firm with a cost-plus contract could receive 
reimbursement for claims payments—a type of question that often arises about traffic 
offenses in domestic contracts. 
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An important doctrinal difference between FCA and contractor 
claims concerns the FCA’s barrier for “combat” claims.  For claims 
against the military, this barrier has been eased and lowered in various 
ways, such as condolence payments out of CERP funds.  However, 
for contractors, it makes sense to eliminate the barrier almost 
altogether.107  The definition of private contractors’ objectives is 
intended to keep what the contractors do out of the definition of 
“hostilities.”  For reasons of international law and local relations, the 
U.S. government prefers both to label what private security does as 
protective activity that involves the use of force only for defense and 
not to consider such purely defensive action as “combat.”108 
A claims system founded on a contract law approach accomplishes 
many important objectives.  First, it helps complete the contract law 
plan.  Contractual provisions concerning training, selection, 
accreditation, and so forth seek to prevent incidents.  When incidents 
occur, contractual provisions trigger reporting requirements and 
claims procedures.  All of these produce audit and investigation trails 
and affect the future use of the contractor, similar to other kinds of 
quality control for contractors in other situations.  The claims 
procedure occurs neutrally and independently and avoids leaving 
either the quality of contract performance or the amount of claim 
payment to the self-interested private security firm. 
D.  Third-Party Beneficiary 
As noted, for all that the claim procedure accomplishes, an 
important role may still remain for private suits in U.S. courts.  Major 
reforming lawsuits can sometimes do what simple individual claims 
by locals cannot: provide discovery regarding the roles of private 
security firms in not preventing incidents, activate the class action 
mechanism, provide authoritative judicial rulings, and open up 
expansive remedies.  Moreover, even the public attention from a 
lawsuit in the United States may produce pressure for reform. 
Once the contract law approach operates, civil suits by victims 
have a whole new potential.  The U.S. government’s agencies may, or 
 
107 In the few instances when contractors do get drawn into joining with military units 
under a combat commander, it may make sense to treat claims the way claims against 
those military units are treated.  However, this situation is rare compared to the common 
occurrence of contractor incidents without any involvement of military units. 
108 Other approaches require the U.S. government to walk too fine a line and water 
down what should remain strong distinctions between what combat troops do and what 
private security does. 
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may not, vigorously implement the contractual requirements.  If an 
agency fails to do so, a private security firm may trigger incidents 
with victims by failing to fulfill its contractual duties.  Then, a 
victim’s suit could provide the mechanism to challenge the company 
for failing to live up to those contractual duties.  This issue matters 
not only in Iraq, but even more for the future of the contract law 
approach to private security contracting.  As discussed later, the 
contract law approach achieves its fullest potential if, besides the 
government overseeing those contract law provisions, those injured 
can invoke the courts to operate as overseers.  Injured civilians and 
their lawyers, including lawyers specializing in human rights cases, 
change the situation from one of helpless occupation to one in which 
there is a kind of accountability for security firms’ abuses.109 
So, it is of high interest to many parties whether the class of those 
injured by faults of contracting firms, e.g., by breach of hiring and 
training provisions, may use contract law tools in private suits.  This 
leads to the inquiry of whether those injured persons constitute a class 
of third-party beneficiaries for the contract provisions previously 
discussed, e.g., contractual requirements for vetting and training of 
the armed contractor employees. 
The law of third-party beneficiaries merits a brief reprise.  As 
commentators explain, “[a] third party beneficiary contract arises 
when two parties enter into an agreement for the benefit of a third 
person.”110  Traditionally, contract law restricted third-party 
beneficiary rights.  This relaxed as the twentieth century began and 
continued relaxing from the first Restatement of Contracts to the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.111  It has become second nature 
that the quality standards in an ordinary contract, e.g., a contract for 
the purchase of a car, may apply to “third-party beneficiaries” who 
are personally injured.  Namely, someone injured by a car made with 
defective brakes or other defective safety features can sue the 
manufacturer.  The victim sues as the third-party beneficiary of the 
applicable warranties in the contract of sale for the car. 
Aside from the general doctrines for third-party beneficiaries, 
special rules have developed for these beneficiaries of government 
contracts.  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts codified these 
 
109 Oversight and pressure for reforms of firms’ practices can occur, preferably with, 
but even without, the government making its own effort. 
110 Summers, supra note 31, at 880. 
111 Id. at 880–81. 
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separate rules in section 313: “The rules stated in this Chapter apply 
to contracts with a government or governmental agency except to the 
extent that application would contravene the policy of the law 
authorizing the contract or prescribing remedies for its breach.”112  
There is also a subsection, section 313(2), devoted to the specific 
issue of consequential damages.113 
Several initial aspects of section 313 support considering injured 
civilians (primarily, in this instance, Iraqis) as third-party 
beneficiaries of the provisions in private security contracts, such as 
those providing for training for security employees.  First, section 313 
starts by applying the regular third-party beneficiary analysis to 
government contracting.114  Furthermore, the Restatement’s 
illustrations 3115 and 5116 for this section support expansive third-
party beneficiary status in the instances of personal injury, precisely 
the issue in Iraq.117 
 
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313(1) (1981) (emphasis added). 
113 In particular, a promisor who contracts with a government or governmental 
agency to do an act for or render a service to the public is not subject to 
contractual liability to a member of the public for consequential damages 
resulting from performance or failure to perform unless (a) the terms of the 
promise provide for such liability; or (b) the promisee is subject to liability to the 
member of the public for the damages and a direct action against the promisor is 
consistent with the terms of the contract and with the policy of the law 
authorizing the contract and prescribing remedies for its breach. 
Id. § 313(2). 
114 Arguments against applying the regular rule are treated as an exception:  “The rules . 
. . apply . . . except to the extent that application would contravene.”  Id. § 313(1).  
Moreover, it is hornbook law that “the status of [parties] as third-party beneficiaries is not 
defeated by the fact that they are not specifically named in the [c]ontracts, since they are 
identified at the time performance is due.”  Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1273 n.23 
(7th  Cir. 1981). 
115 A, a municipality, enters into a contract with B, by which B promises to build a 
subway and to pay damages directly to any person who may be injured by the 
work of construction.  Because of the work done in the construction of the 
subway, C’s house is injured by the settling of the land on which it stands.  D 
suffers personal injuries from the blasting of rock during the construction.  B is 
under a contractual duty to C and D. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 cmt. c, illus. 3. 
116 A, a municipality, owes a duty to the public to keep its streets in repair.  B, a 
street railway company, contracts to keep a portion of these streets in repair but 
fails to do so.  C, a member of the public, is injured thereby.  He may bring 
actions against A and B and can recover judgment against each of them. 
Id. § 313 cmt. c, illus. 5. 
117 Illustration 3 in particular drives home this point.  That illustration shows that a 
contractor who injures bystanders in either their person or property is liable for damages.  
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Above all, the “exception” language in section 313 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts causes the analysis to turn on the 
“policy of the law authorizing the contract or prescribing remedies for 
its breach.”118  So, the question as to third-party beneficiaries of post-
Nisour Square “quality control” contract provisions, such as those 
concerning training or accreditation, turns on what the “policy” of the 
law is.  Contractors would argue that, as with provisions of U.S. 
government contracts in general, the provisions exist of, by, and for 
the U.S. government.  Moreover, the government has its own internal 
remedies for enforcement.  Whether the government actually resorts 
to strong remedies such as termination for default by private security 
firms, these firms would argue, is irrelevant.119 
The better arguments indicate that the policy behind the “quality 
control” contract provisions is meant to reduce harm to civilians.  
This does support considering injured civilians as third-party 
beneficiaries.  Above all, the policy reason for instituting these rules 
after Nisour Square has been, and continues to be, limiting the 
alienation of the local population from the United States.  Training 
and so forth has as its raison d’etre to protect civilians; in other 
words, protecting civilians is not merely some unintended and 
incidental benefit. 
As a classic law review casenote put it, a right of action is favored 
“when there is evidence that existing remedies are inadequate and that 
additional remedies would increase the likelihood of compliance and 
afford direct relief to a class which the legislature wished to 
protect.”120  And this third-party beneficiary status does not amount 
to opening the floodgates of private litigation against government 
contractors.121  Conversely, the argument that such suits would 
 
This is to be expected.  A bystander who sues without being injured typically argues a 
right to receive a benefit in the government contracting context.  This bystander’s case is 
less compelling than a bystander who is injured and has suffered, without having done 
wrong, not merely the denial of a benefit but the infliction of a loss—and a personal injury 
loss at that. 
118 Id. § 313(1). 
119 Lawsuits, they would argue, would disturb the delicate balance and discretion of the 
government’s contracting officers and other contract overseers. 
120 Recent Case, supra note 32, at 653. 
121 Relatively few features of government contractors match the particular record 
underlying contract provisions to protect Iraqi civilians.  While some new government 
contracts do arise from major incidents or scandals, these very rarely concern injured 
civilians, as the private security contracts do, but usually concern incidents or problems in 
contract award, modification, finance, etc. 
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interfere with the government’s own internal remedies does not match 
reality.  The government’s overseers of these contracts are sometimes 
overwhelmed by the scale of their many tasks.  Budget considerations 
limit their numbers, particularly in the theater of war.  These 
government overseers have rarely gone through the full procedures to 
impose the strongest remedy, termination, for default.  Private suits 
on behalf of injured civilians supplement the internal overseers, not 
hinder them. 
CONCLUSION 
The rise of the global private military industry has elicited 
extensive and diverse positions in legal literature.  Some writers argue 
a total incompatibility between the emerging private military and 
something fundamental.  Perhaps, they argue, sovereignty itself, 
defined as the state’s monopoly on the use of force, clashes with the 
emerging private military.122  Or perhaps the established international 
law, such as the Geneva Conventions on the limited war role of 
contractors, clashes with the emerging private military. 
On the other hand, some writers posit solutions to the problems 
created by the private military industry along the lines of, loosely 
speaking, new international humanitarian law123 or criminal or tort 
lawsuits.  Those supporting criminal prosecution solutions look to a 
larger role for MEJA or the UCMJ.  Others support civil lawsuits 
based on norms such as the law of nations, pursuant to the ATCA. 
This Article does not dispute the importance of international, 
criminal, or tort law perspectives on the emerging, global private 
military industry.  On the contrary, it views such perspectives as very 
possibly having validity.  Nevertheless, the contract law approach 
brings distinct advantages.  First, it applies to the private military 
firms, rather than to their employees.  The firms have the resources 
and status, which their individual employees alone do not, to initiate 
and improve major programs for preventing injuries or abuses—
programs such as accreditation, training, and vetting of new hires.  
Second, the contract law approach uses, and conforms to, the main 
thrust of government contracting law and its apparatus, which is the 
 
122 See, e.g., Scott M. Sullivan, Private Force/Public Goods, 42 CONN. L. REV. 853, 
861–62. 
123 See Gaston, supra note 15, at 243–45. 
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system that purchases private military services and oversees the 
implementation of that purchase.124 
Generalizing further, contract law tools in this context and in 
related ones may produce a virtuous cycle.  Commentators on 
international law have tended to expect a “top-down” effect—that 
international agreements or principles on private security will bring 
about individual state regulation.125  Top-down international law may 
work.  But, as a supplement, the elaboration of contract law tools by 
the United States in the context of the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan may affect both future U.S. action and action by other 
nations.  For example, when the United States sets accreditation and 
training standards, both U.S. firms and third-country firms will seek 
to meet them.  It then becomes simpler for other countries, such as 
those in the European Community, to institute similar standards; once 
the United States adopts standards, European firms that do business 
with the United States develop familiarity with, and a record of 
meeting, those standards. 
The role of contract law tools in this context might serve as a 
model in other contexts.  For example, government contracting firms 
often play important environmental roles.  They may clean up, store, 
process, or dispose of waste.  Criminal suit, civil suit, administrative 
action, international law, and other methods for dealing with 
problems with these firms may well work.  Still, as a supplement, 
government contracting firms should come to comply with contract 
provisions on such matters and may be part of developing standards 
as to further provisions and strengthened contract oversight.  This 
approach supplements, without supplanting, the other approaches. 
Doubters may raise some legitimate questions.  Above all, the 
contract law tools depend on the government departments making the 
contracts actually taking active oversight roles, rather than depending 
on neutral bodies like courts or international agencies or on private 
lawsuits.  For many reasons, departments may not rush to do so.126  In 
 
124 Criminal cases and tort suits have their usefulness, but government contracting law 
operates largely in channels that do not depend on these actions.  Instead, government 
contract law uses contract provisions and oversight from contracting officers, agencies that 
assist them, other agencies like inspectors general, and, under specific circumstances, 
third-party beneficiary activity. 
125 See generally Gaston, supra note 15; Shawn McCormack, Note, Private Security 
Contractors in Iraq Violate Laws of War, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 75 (2007). 
126 The departments may have loyalty to private security firms for reasons ranging from 
gratitude for their services to an entrenched interest among strong supporters of 
contemporary policy on a war.  Quite apart from such loyalty, officials may have a high 
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any event, whether from inertia, capture, or sincere views of national 
interest, departmental officials themselves may not rush to exercise 
their contract law tools.127 
These serious doubts may explain the limited uses of contract law 
tools before Nisour Square.  However, the significant steps taken after 
Nisour Square tell a different story.128  The increasingly used contract 
law tools, such as provisions requiring training and incident reporting, 
represented advances.  Expanding that use did not require intervention 
by a neutral body, like a court or an international organization.  
Rather, the force of the public reaction—from Iraqis, Americans, and 
people of other countries—sufficed.129 
Moreover, time brings congressional attention and new 
administrations into office.  The limits that one administration 
imposes on its action, Congress or a successor administration may 
move beyond.  Much of the history of government contracting, 
including advances in response to incidents or scandals, involves the 
use of contract law tools pushed by Congress or new 
administrations.130 
Private security contractors represent an important new type of 
nonstate institutions and are becoming increasing important in 
national security and international affairs.  As organizations that exist 
by contracts, they represent an opportunity for reform through the 
contract law approach.  How that approach works with the reality of 
 
awareness of the need to rely on the firms and a reluctance to tamper with the terms for 
obtaining what the officials need. 
127 Doubts may also arise regarding whether many of the countries that resort to private 
military firms, particularly third-world countries, nondemocracies, or both will follow the 
United States by imposing or enforcing restraints on such firms.  The indirect influence of 
U.S. contract tools may constrain major countries from operating very differently 
elsewhere.  Moreover, for some users of private military, no approach may work—not 
civil suits, international organizations, nor the indirect influence of U.S. contract tools.  
Still, controlling problems in the United States and some other countries, even if not 
worldwide, would represent a major advance. 
128 To be sure, there were limits on the administrative reaction after the incident.  The 
contract with Blackwater was not terminated; in fact, the State Department initially 
exercised its option to continue the contract. 
129 See Ginger Thompson & Katherine Zoepf, Lawyers Say U.S. Reckless in Charges 
for 5 Guards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at A28 (“[I]mmunity for security contractors 
became a major issue recently in negotiations of the security pact that lays the ground rules 
for American troops’ continuing presence in Iraq.”). 
130 For example, in the early 1960s, the new administration of President Kennedy and 
Congress invoked those tools, in response to scandals during the 1950s, to have greater 
disclosure of contractor pricing information and greater controls on ethics issues, such as 
revolving doors in employment. 
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private security in Iraq and Afghanistan will provide guidance for the 
future of dealing with such institutions. 
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